One of the more important forces shaping the Digital Economy is the emergence of platform-based ecosystems. The functioning of platform ecosystems is, however, still very poorly understood. More specifically, our received wisdom on rational competitive behaviour is proving to be counter-intuitive when trying to understand platform competition. This article reviews the most relevant issues that are being raised by scholars studying platforms. The proposed research framework addresses theoretical as well as practical managerial concerns found in industry platforms, namely: structural conditions, strategic orientation, platform design elements, value creation mechanisms, and strategic games. The review is supplemented with case studies to help illustrate some of the practical business issues.
Introduction
One of the more important forces shaping the Digital Economy is the emergence of platform-based ecosystems. Companies developing new value propositions based on platform principles have become increasingly attractive to venture capitalist firms.
Multi-billion dollar companies such as Amazon and Microsoft have all adopted platform principles as part of their competitive strategies.
Platform ecosystems are made of customers and partners complementing the offer of the core platform working in a collaborative arrangement that is actively shaped by the platform owner but that promotes value co-creation and sharing. Other examples of platform ecosystems are Intel, ARM, Apple, Salesforce, eBay, Facebook and Google that license their platform technologies to independent software and hardware vendors and enable exchange between multiple parties in markets often displaying network effects.
Platform businesses differ significantly from non-platform counterparts in terms of their economic rational and strategic behaviour. This article reviews the economic game-theoretic analysis applied to industry and multi-sided platforms. Industry platforms are innovation ecosystem organised around a core technology with a modular architecture. Multi-sided market platforms facilitate exchange between multiple type of users usually exhibiting network effects. In platform competition, network externalities are a key factor for success.
The aim of this research article is to provide a coherent structure to the flourishing literature on the increasing variety of issues related to the study of industry and multisided platform competition. The microeconomic, and strategic and innovation management literature, which focuses on issues ranging from network effects, through standardisation and complimentary products, and to multi-side markets, remains fragmented. This research article differentiates between competition 'across' platforms and competition 'within' platforms. Although 'across' platform competition will continue capturing headlines -Apple versus Google, ARM versus Intel, promoting a better understanding of 'within' platform competition has real economic significance.
The insights presented in this research article will enable platform-owners and their complementor firms identify and implement more appropriate strategies to co-innovate and grow within platform ecosystems. The concrete research objectives of this review article are:
 To revisit and extend the concept of platform competition.
 To synthesise the strategic issues and structural conditions shaping platform competition.
 To develop a typology of strategic games relevant to the functioning of platforms.
The proposed analytical addresses theoretical as well as practical managerial concerns found in industry platforms, namely: structural conditions, strategic orientation, platform design elements, value creation mechanisms, and strategic games. More specifically, this research article includes a discussion of basic constitutive elements such as architectural-design decisions, and the interplay of direct and indirect network effects. These elements together can generate a critical mass of adopters and also help a diverse ecosystem of complementor firms achieve and sustain economies of scale and scope. This article includes an analysis of the main mechanisms promoting collaboration and competition within and across platforms. A particular focus of this research article is to isolate and highlight the structural conditions that may enhance the effectiveness and performance of industry platforms as a whole, as well as identifying a set of strategic games that platform owners and their complementor firms could adopt.
Review Methodology
This article presents a new framework for the strategic analysis of value creation and value capture in industry and multi-sided market platforms (see table 2 ). The vast majority of existing game-theoretic analyses on platforms focuses on non-cooperative games and monopolistic or oligopolistic market structures. Nevertheless, this article adopts 'coopetition' as the main mind-set and reinterprets the quantitative findings and feed them into the new framework. This article synthesises the findings of over 150 game-theoretic journal articles and working papers (see appendices A.1 and A.2). Note that one-page summaries of the journal articles and working papers are available from the author.
Besides scientific rigour, in order to make this review as pragmatic as possible, this article draws and extends existing ideas that have been applied to the analysis of value creation (Nalebuff and Brandenburger 1996) , by Osterwalder and Pigneur 2010) and presents a compelling real-world example that have been elaborated using the new framework .
Literature Review

Categorising Platforms
Platforms have been categorised using many different typologies (see Evans et al 2011) .
This research article categorises platforms into two broad types. The first probably most known type, multi-sided market platforms, essentially enable the exchange of product and services between two or more groups of people, typically consumers and producers. The term two-sided market was originally coined by Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole to describe businesses with two interacting sides in a ground-breaking paper in 1991. Table 1 provides a brief description of some well known platforms in the consumer, professional and enterprise sectors. In all these platforms, game and app publishers and also advertisers benefit from being able to tap into these communities of users.
Osterwalder and Pigneur's (2010) defines multi-sided [market] platforms as bringing together two or more distinct but interdependent groups of customers. Such platforms are of value to one group of customers only if the other groups of customers are also present. The platform creates value by facilitating interactions between the different groups. A multi-sided platform grows in value to the extent that it attracts more users, a phenomenon known as network effects. In the case of Facebook, their social media platform enables end-users to store in digital form personal data such as written comments, images and videos. These can then be shared with family and friends, which in turn can be commented upon and tagged 'like' or 'dislike'.
MULTI-SIDED MARKET PLATFORMS
Apple
In the case of Apple, their mobile app platform enables third-party developers to distribute applications that can be downloaded and used by consumers.
Google
Google provides a search engine that allows end users to search, filter and retrieve information almost instantly from thousands of websites across the planet. The accumulated key-word searchers help their engine to be more relevant to end-users.
LinkedIn 1
The world's leading professional services platform connects individual users (professionals), recruiters and advertisers. The company derives significant revenues from premium subscriptions (20%), advertising solutions (30%) and recruiting solutions (50%). The company is currently attempting to attract two additional sides: company HR departments that would set up LinkedIn profiles to interact with their employees, and application developers. The challenge is that some individual users might not welcome the presence of corporate users (their employers) and that applications would have to be strictly restricted to a professional context.
One of the leading online dating services in the United States. eHarmony has strict governance rules among for both access and interactions, screening applicants by requiring them to complete a questionnaire of approximately 250 questions and then refusing membership to some applicants, even if they are willing to pay the membership fee. eHarmony's members are not allowed to view profiles and communicate freely, using a matching algorithm to generate potential matches for every member, and each member can communicate only with her or his potential matches
Salesforce is the leading provider of web-based customer relationship management (CRM) and enterprise cloud computing applications. The company's web-based solution has enabled Salesforce to achieve lower implementation costs and facilitate more flexible integration with customers. Salesforce.com derives its revenues from two sources: subscription revenues, which are comprised of subscription fees from customers accessing their cloud computing application services, and from customers purchasing additional support beyond the standard support that is included in the basic subscription fee; and related professional services and other revenues consisting primarily of training fees.
Open Data Soft 3
OpenDataSoft is a cloud-based turnkey platform designed for smart and easy transformation of all types of data into innovative services. Its mission is make it easier for business users to publish, share and reuse data. Within their customers, there are cities, energy providers, transportation companies and traffic technology suppliers. The platform is helping implementing comprehensive smart city solutions. Understanding the mechanisms of formation and functioning of industry platforms requires investigating the dynamics and inter-relationships between the core platform firm, hardware and software "complementors" and users.
What all these platforms have in common is that they provide a very unique service; a social media repository in the case of Facebook, an app repository in the case of iTunes, and a search engine in the case of Google, and at no initial costs to the end user -i.e., most apps in iTunes are free to consumers; users pay for third-party premium apps.
Besides platform services being free to the end-users, what could explain the almost geometrical growth of their user base?
Part of the explanation resides in the value that complementor firms can add to the basic offering of the platform. In the case of Facebook, besides the social media aspects, it is the additional functionality such as within-page online games likes Farmville and Fairyland, amongst others, that grab users. Complementors not only create more value to end users, they can also capture that value in the form of shared revenue. Providing a unique service that is valuable to end users and having complementors are two of the many elements that are involved when building a platform's user base. 
Competing within and across Platforms
The new framework shown in figure and table 2 addresses theoretical as well as practical managerial concerns found in platforms, namely: structural conditions, strategic orientation, platform design elements, value creation mechanisms, and strategic games.
FIGURE 2. Research framework TABLE 2. Overview of competition across and within platforms ACROSS WITHIN STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS
The specific nature of the industry will dictate the overall regime for value creation and value capture. The relative market position of the overall platform will also influence the value logic. Traditional industry forces, and the characteristics of the knowledge production system can also intertwine with the platform
The type and mix of complementors will shape the set of collaborative games. In addition, the exact nature of the exchange and the position within network of complementors will also shape who captures most of the value from the collaboration.
STRATEGIC ORIENTATION
Promoting economies of scale and scope is a strategic concern. Platforms will also attempt to tip the market, trying to attract the majority of users, and using various strategies from merger and acquisition, to bundling and envelopment, and even enabling standard interfaces to competitor platforms to selected popular features but that have been first commoditized. Timing and positioning are key strategic decisions.
Complementors will attempt to secure selected niches by deepening the degree of specialisation of their extended features. Complementors will also partner with other complementors, but usually one type of complementor may be in a better position to capture value of the collaboration over other types.
PLATFORM DESIGN ELEMENTS
Besides providing a technological solution to a concrete problem, the hub of a platform captures followers by allowing complementor firms extend the features of its core. Open standard interfaces enable outside firms to innovate complementary products, promoting economies of scale and scope. The degree of platform differentiation and compatibility is a major design decision that will shape how users adopt a particular platform.
A key challenge is to balance competition and collaboration between the platform leader and ecosystem partners. Complementors identify new productmarket niches and extend the core with specialised features that are highly valued by specific market segments.
VALUE CREATION, CAPTURE AND SHARING MECHANISMS
In early stages, platform need to satisfy the need of their early adopters, which can be idiosyncratic compared to the mass of late adopters. In later stages, the value logic needs to appeal to a majority of users for the platform to be successful. The platform should be capable of generating value surpluses that can be shared amongst a variety of users and complementor types.
The design of the platform must allow for positive direct 'same-side' and cross-side effects, e.g., as more users enter the platform, the more benefits to the other users on the same side of the market and also on the other side respectively. Indirect network effects create value from thirdparty complementor firms, such as developers and vendors adding more software packages to operating systems and microprocessor manufacturers.
STRATEGIC GAMES
Traditional economic principles apply to games between platforms, including building barriers to entry and reducing power of consumers and/or suppliers. Barriers include locking-in and high switching costs (e.g., backward compatibility within same platform).
The set of non-cooperative and cooperative games at complementor-level are not yet properly understood. Key challenges, strategic moves, and critical factors are discussed in Part IV.
Structural Conditions
Structural conditions can influence a platform as a whole and to the individual complementor firms within the platform ecosystem. From the perspective of the whole platform, structural conditions such as the market position of a particular platform relative to competitor platforms can shape the value creation and capture logic 
Strategic Orientation
A strategic concern of an industry platform is promoting economies of scale and scope.
Platforms will attempt to tip the market trying to attract the majority of users 
Platform Design Elements
Providing a technological solution to a concrete industry problem is amongst the key design elements for a platform to be successful (e.g., ARM providing low-energy microprocessors to the smartphone and embedded industry). In addition, the modular architecture of the platform and its governance will directly impact its user ecosystem (Tiwana, Konsynski and Bush 2010; Pablos-Heredero, Lopez-Berzosa and SanchezGonzalez 2012) . A platform can acquires customer by allowing complementor firms extend the features of its core and by promoting the widespread adoption of standard interfaces. A key challenge is to balance competition and collaboration between the platform leader and ecosystem partners. The degree of platform differentiation and compatibility is a major design decision that will shape how users adopt a particular platform. Platform owners may want to extend the scope of their platform and integrate into complementary markets that offer the promise of larger revenues (like Microsoft makes both Windows and Office as well as other applications that complement Windows). But movement into complements creates a disincentive for ecosystem partners to invest in innovation around the platform or to continue using the platform (Farrell and Katz, 2000) . One alternative, as described by Gawer and Cusumano (2002) and Gawer and Henderson (2007) , is for the platform leader to retain control of the basic architecture while allowing complementors to innovate on top of the platform as well as to help move the platform technology forward.
Value Creation Mechanisms
Value creation mechanisms present at the 'whole' platform-level are linked to the age and stage of development of the platform. Although similar mechanisms are present in most stages, these differ in importance depending on the particular development stage of the platform. In early stages, platform need to satisfy the need of their early adopters, which can be idiosyncratic compared to the mass of late adopters when the logic for value creation and capturing has not yet been defined in stone (Bhargava, Kim and Sun 2013; Casey and Töyli 2012) . In later stages, the value creation and capturing logic needs to appeal to a majority of users for the platform to be successful. The platform should be capable of generating value surpluses that can be shared amongst a variety of complementor types.
Embarking in collaboration brings many opportunities but also potential challenges for both the core platform firm and its complementor partners. Partner firms can easily get trapped in inefficient and even vicious non-cooperative games with low levels of productivity and value creation. Balancing value creation and value appropriation is a key issue in the strategic management of industry platforms. The locus of strategic management of platform ecosystems needs shifting from the traditional zero-sum competitive approach based on value appropriation towards "co-opetition" based on value co-creation and shared appropriation; see figure 2. Mechanisms for promoting value creation among complementors include generating positive externalities through architectural design and pricing, and relinquishing control and ownership to complementor firms. Figure 3 shows a simplified view of platform adoption.
FIGURE 3. Architectural and pricing elements of platform adoption
Perhaps the most important difference when it comes to industry platforms is their potential to create network effects -the positive feedback loops that can grow at exponentially increasing rates as adoption of the platform and the number of complements rise. These feedback mechanisms for promoting value creation include generating positive externalities through 'same-side' direct, cross-side and indirect network effects. First, the design of the platform must allow for positive same-side direct and cross-side effects, e.g., as more users enter the platform, the more benefits to the other users on the same side of the market, as well as on the other side of the market respectively. Indirect network effects create value from third-party complementor firms, such as developers and vendors adding more software packages to operating systems and microprocessor manufacturers.
The network effects can be very powerful, especially when they are "direct" or on the "same-side" between the platform and the user. 
Strategic Games
Game Theory is concerned with strategic interaction among several decision-makers, where each player is aware of the fact that his actions affect the well-being of the other players, just is their actions affect his. In game theory, the term "game" is used to describe interactive encounters between several rational participants. Each game has predetermined rules of engagement. These rules (e.g., joint venture agreements), define the structure of the game. The motivating forces are the actions or strategies that participants can employ. It is also assumed that each participant is able to rate the outcome of the encounter, which depends on the actions of all the participants, and based on their own order of priorities. These outcomes are expressed in numeric form and are called the payoffs or levels of utility of the various available strategies players can take (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1995).
What specific challenges platform owner and complementors encounter? Do these challenges have known game solutions? Table 3 depicts and categorises strategic games relevant to platforms. Challenges and dilemmas common to platforms are discussed and paired with possible strategic moves that platform owners and complementor firms could adopt to successfully compete and potentially collaborate. The following discussion includes the key issues that need to be taken into account when implementing a chosen strategy. (Evans 2007) . For instance, payment systems organised around credit cards share these characteristics. On the one hand, the more merchants accepting a particular card, the higher the benefits for consumers carrying this card, and vice versa. On the other hand, merchants compete for the trade of consumers.
Another challenge for industry platforms owners is promoting long-term innovation versus short-term appropriation. This dilemma is referred as Goldilocks Governance
Problem by Tiwana et al (2010) . Degree of ownership and openness needs taking into account the creation and sharing of potential surpluses in all sides of the market.
Single versus multiple product versioning is another dilemma for industry platforms. The creation of a public good, one that is non-rival and non-excludable, simultaneously
introduces incentive compatibility problems due to free riding. In this case, a third party developer might wish to invest in an enhancement but also to dishonour the principle of releasing source code upon expiration of the proprietary period. The sponsor's task is to offer developers sufficient value in affiliating with its platform that developers choose to create a derivative work in preference to incurring the cost of developing an independent platform. This implies that the offer of developer profits collected during the proprietary period must be greater than the developer could earn independently, accounting for the cost of independent platform development and the lower cost of reusing common code (Parker and Van Alstyne 2009) 
Case Study: PLAT.ONE
PLAT.ONE is a leading enterprise-grade 'Internet of Things' application platform (see Table 4 ). It is a complete, 'Cloud and Fog ready', end-to-end application platform used to develop and deploy large-scale enterprise and mission-critical IoT and M2M
applications. PLAT.ONE provides full-stack scalability, security and fault-tolerance with 'big data ready' and open integration. PLAT.ONE can be implemented as a public or private platform, or even in a hybrid, semi-public approach. The platform dynamics, therefore, are not limited to the private deployment. As an example, a system integrator developed a water utility management application template that can be used in the public cloud that Deutsche Telekom has deployed or in the Selex private multi-tenant cloud -and vice versa. The main challenge facing PLAT.ONE is making sure that innovations in one part of the ecosystem become value added to other parts of the ecosystem. Besides new design features, cross-network effects need to promote community building. in terms of governance, key issues are the incentives for partners to join or for customers to contribute their bespoke innovations back to the ecosystem as a whole. PLAT.ONE has library of ready-to-use vertical applications to provide rapid development and deployment of Enterprise-Grade applications.
The focus is on expanding the number of devices under management -expanding the footprint and penetration of the platform with high-leverage and scale customers. While early work was focused on developing the Enterprise-Grade platform and features, the key focus now is to develop vertical solution kits on the platform, making it easy for end customers to develop bespoke M2M and IoT applications.
The core platform development is done internally driven by strategic plans and customer feedback. PLAT.ONE has an extensive and industry-standards based API that exposes significant functionality that enables third parties, system integrators and 
Final Discussion and Conclusion
Strategic Challenges
Platforms must address several strategic challenges: get the platform design and pricing right to promote direct and indirect network externalities that can help create and share value, cope with winner-take-all competition, and avoid envelopment by an A pricing strategy ignoring the dynamics of the interaction between the multiple sides would lead to a suboptimal pricing strategy for the intermediary platform. A key challenge in two-sided markets is therefore balancing the contributions to profit of the two sides. Often the fee on side of the non-subsidised side takes into account the monopoly price for this side and an opportunity cost that accounts for the revenue generated on the other side of the market (Weyl 2010) . Competition within platforms is shaped by the chicken and egg nature of the activity, as the driver of success on one side is success on the other side each user of a platform is both a consumer of the service and an input for the service offered to the other side. Platforms pricing strategies then reflect the competition to sell the service, but also the competition to buy the input. this dual nature of competition may generate complex strategies using cross-subsidies and a departure of prices from marginal costs (Weyl 2010) .
Highly asymmetric pricing is common in multi-sided markets. For example, Google's search platform and most of its other services are free to users, while advertisers pay for access to that audience. Sellers in Amazon's and Ebay's online stores pay participation fees, while buyers do not. Merchants pay for access to e-commerce payment platforms, which are free to consumers (Bakos and Katsamakas 2008).
The decision of which side of the market to subsidise depends on various factors. A side is subsidized when the price it faces is lower than the price it would face in an independent market, which contributes more network externality surplus to the other 
Extending the Notion of Competition
Our received wisdom on competitive behaviour is proving to be counter-intuitive when trying to understand platform competition. The traditional analysis of competition based on quantity-costs constrained by industry structures and which promotes winlose mechanisms is being challenged by strategy scholars. A particular feature of platform ecosystems is that the outcome of the behaviour of firms does not depend on their own actions alone, but also on the outcomes of others who can oppose or reinforce those actions. Although this greatly helps with model parsimony, it also limits the opportunity to explore potentially important real-world endogenous behaviour.
A challenging but fruitful theoretical endeavour is to develop a theory of market organisation based on the (repeated) interaction of individual firm behaviours within platform ecosystems, rather than other way round. In addition, studies incorporating network structure attributes in platforms analysis can be of relevance for the analysis of social media platforms. For instance, Candogan, Bimpikis, and Ozdaglar (2012) analysed how social network attributes (e.g., centrality) can affect optimal pricing strategies.
Overall, scholars have just started to scrap the surface of what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for successfully competing in emerging platforms.
Afterword
Will our future be characterised by a handful of monopolistic corporations dominating all the ambits of economic activity and innovation? Or, will it be made up of a myriad of 
A.2 Working papers included in the review
